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Abstract
The paper starts with an ultra-compact deposition on the two ubiqui-tous complementary dual pairwise organized methodological pro-cedures of episteme, i.e. the analytic method (analysis – synthesis) 
& the abstract process (abstraction – structure). Next, the authors examine 
some ground rules and concepts pervading causality and inference and 
their junctions, attempting to discriminate between information flow in 
empiricism and theoretical causality of proof; only then is a connection 
between them attempted and investigated. In the authors’ effort to establish 
a consistent theoretical outlook, if not approach, the technique of logical 
inversions is also used as a partial yet powerful guide elucidating how suc-
cessful their attempts were. Apart from clarifying some opaque concepts in 
logic, in set theory and in the staple empiricism of science, this paper also 
sets the stage for questioning whether some grave flaws could be located 
in traditional, save ill-founded, notions in hardcore science, on occasion of 
the par excellence typical example of fundamental and never challenged ap-
proaches in physics. The fact that something has been accepted as holding 
does not at all mean that cracks may not be located in its epistemological 
makeup at some posterior time. And it is the text’s task here to ask some 
painful questions and try to set some realistic boundaries to things by apt-
ly utilizing available irresistible standard «tricks» from logic and from the 
classical scientific method and from reverting to fruitful techniques and to 
telling examples, pushing hard for convincing answers.
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Περίληψη
Tο παρόν άρθρο ξεκινάει με μίαν επιγραμματικά υπερσυμπαγή κα-τάθεση επάνω στις δύο πανταχού παρούσες συμπληρωματικές διτ-τές ζεύγδην οργανωμένες μεθοδολογικές διεργασίες της επιστήμης, 
ήτοι στην αναλυτική μέθοδο (ανάλυση – σύνθεση) και στην αφαιρετική 
διεργασία (αφαίρεση – δομή). Στη συνέχεια, οι συγγραφείς εξετάζουν πα-
ραδειγματικά κάποιους θεμελιώδεις κανόνες και αρχές που διέπουν την 
αιτιότητα και τη συνεπαγωγή κι τους συνδυασμούς τους, προσπαθώντας 
να καταστήσουν σαφή τη διάκριση ανάμεσα στην εμπειριστική ροή των 
πληροφοριών και στη θεωρητική αιτιότητα της αποδεικτικής∙ μόνο τότε 
επιχειρείται και διερευνάται σύνδεση μεταξύ τους. Στην προσπάθειά τους 
να εδραιώσουν θεωρητική ματιά συνεπή, αν όχι προσέγγιση, οι συγγραφείς 
μεταχειρίζονται επίσης την τεχνική των λογικών αναστροφών ως μερικό 
αλλά ωστόσο ισχυρό οδηγό για την αποτίμηση του πόσο επιτυχείς υπήρξαν 
οι απόπειρές τους. Σ’ αυτό το άρθρο, εκτός από τη διασάφηση αδιαφανών 
(τελικά) εννοιών της λογικής, της συνολοθεωρίας και των εμπειριστικών 
λεγόμενων παρατηρησιακών θετικών πεδίων (της scientia, ειδητικής κατά 
πρόταση των συγγραφέων αλλού), τίθενται επίσης οι βάσεις για τη διε-
ρεύνηση του κατά πόσον κάποια σοβαρότατα ελαττώματα βαρύνουν και 
μπορούν να εντοπιστούν σε παραδοσιακά αποδεκτά, πλην προβληματι-
κά σκληροπυρηνικά λεγόμενα παρατηρησιακά θετικά γνωσιακά πεδία 
(sciences), μ’ αφόρμηση στο κατ’ εξοχήν αντιπροσωπευτικό παράδειγμα 
θεμελιωδών κι ουδέποτε αμφισβητούμενων προσεγγίσεων στη φυσική. Το 
γεγονός ότι κάτι έχει κάποτε επικρατήσει διόλου δεν σημαίνει ότι δεν μπο-
ρούν να εντοπιστούν ρωγμές στο επιστημολογικό οικοδόμημά του σε κά-
ποιο μεταγενέστερο χρόνο. Κι είναι έργο του κειμένου εδώ να διατυπώσει 
κάποια επώδυνα ερωτήματα και να πασχίσει να  θέσει κάποια ρεαλιστικά 
όρια στα πράγματα, με την κατάλληλη αξιοποίηση διαθέσιμων ακαταμάχη-
των πάγιων «τεχνασμάτων» από τη λογική, από την κλασική επιστημονική 
μέθοδο κι από την καταφυγή σε αποδοτικές τεχνικές και σ’ εύγλωττα παρα-
δείγματα, ασκώντας ισχυρές πιέσεις για απαντήσεις πειστικές.
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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is twofold.
On one hand, its first purpose is to demonstrate the priority of logic 
– an almost forgotten principle of both applied and theoretical sciences. 
Science is an imperialist, exclusive, authoritarian, powerful, controlling 
system (Collins & Evans, 2002; Latour & Woolgar, 1986), as expressed by 
“expert scientists” who have every reason to endorse data-driven statistics, 
but (eventually) do not have enough reason to focus on an absolute priority 
of abstract argument-driven logic and not violate it. This type of attitude, 
i.e. the one pervading leading contemporary science, relishes in mixing up 
and haphazardly clouding up logical orderliness of arguments with empir-
ical observation of objects and phenomena, i.e. priorities between meth-
odology and description. In so doing, it has landed up on a clever way of 
excluding “non-experts” from expressing any opinion about each science’s 
assumptions –let alone from doubting, challenging or proposing reforms 
regarding statutory matters. But this is against episteme’s basic / statutory 
values. Thus, the required validity of the form of building arguments gets 
mixed up with their content; this constitutes a treacherous state of affairs 
which has been known, pointed out and studied in logic, starting from the 
so-called philosophical logic and rhetoric since classical Greek and Roman 
antiquity. The difference between science and episteme has been discussed 
elsewhere. With logic alone, in the proper sense of the concept, one may 
delve very deeply into the sciences and even propose revolutionary reforms.
On the other hand, the second purpose of this paper and of the ones 
following is to underline the necessity and perhaps delineate a core direc-
tion towards proposing statutory changes in logic as a system itself. Formal 
/ symbolic logic evolved from the 19th century on with the ability to serve 
applications, which are rigorously prescribed and described within the for-
mulation; developing any theoretical system not in pure abstraction but in 
association to practical applications, or, worse, with practical applications 
as a main focal purpose is inherently problematic, i.e. ideologically asym-
metrical, partial and even sketchy at times.




As was discussed in Papageorgiou & Lekkas (2018), following what has 
first been laid out in an exemplary way in Lekkas (2003), the theoretical 
method of science and its entire context (or the epistemonic method) in-
volves two complementary self-coupling procedural tools; the analytic 
method and the abstractive process (Lekkas, 2003; Papageorgiou & Lekkas, 
2018; Παπαγεωργίου & Λέκκας, 2014). In a sketchy sort of way, they both 
involve a mutual auto-reverse pair of constituent procedures each, ideally 
obeying some basic guidelines.
•	 The analytic method involves two stages of mutually opposite senses, 
analysis and synthesis, subject to the following three rules of thumb: 
no analysis without synthesis, no synthesis without analysis, no start-
ing synthesis before completion of analysis. In this sense: analysis is a 
breakup into constituents, whereas synthesis is a (re)composition back 
towards the integral object or procedure or phenomenon and effectively 
constitutes a return from an accomplished and complete analysis.
•	 The abstractive process involves two stages of mutually opposite senses, 
abstraction and structure, subject to the following three rules of thumb: 
no abstraction without structure, no structure without abstraction, no 
starting structure before completion of abstraction. In this parallel sense: 
abstraction is a gradual inclusion of an element in ever-wider supersets 
starting from inclusion in the singleton or unit set, along with the clas-
sifying criterion of including something into a set, rising in ever-wider 
including sets (and types and categories for those more favourable to the 
corresponding particular theoretical setups), reflecting properties and/
or qualities, following upon a stage-by-stage path of generalization lead-
ing to some terminal level of total / absolute abstraction, whereas syn-
thesis is a route of (re)specialization back towards the concrete singleton 
including one elementary object or procedure or phenomenon (and thence 
potentially to its content, which is now a single “element” or “member” 
in set-theoretical language), and effectively constitutes a return from an 
accomplished and complete abstraction.
These two pairwise organized methodological procedures actually face 
in mutually opposite directions, having a shared dual conjugate starting 
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point, contingent on the oftentimes hard and treacherous dialectics of the 
duality between element and singleton and of judgment or establishment 
or agreement or convention regarding its status. However, from then on, 
they deviate from each other in anti-diametric senses, as was already said, 
a. analysis running towards a stage by stage segmentation and b. abstrac-
tion running towards a step by step inclusion in logic-theoretical wider 
inclusive supersets (a concept also pretty much expressed in the relevant 
terminology as predicates).
For example, if the starting point is a house, in analysis one would e.g. 
break it up into materials such as bricks, concrete, wood etc., or sections 
such as floors, rooms, kitchens, staircases, or constituent parts such as win-
dows, doors and walls etc., whereas, in generalizing abstraction, one would 
include it in categories, e.g. urban complexes, or degrees of architectural 
artistic value and elegance, or placement in considerations of tradition and 
modernity, or agreement with respect to its fulfilling criteria of comfort, of 
class etc. etc. On the other hand, conversely so to speak, synthesis would 
be the process employed for going from e.g. materials or sections or con-
stituent parts (windows, doors and walls) to entire houses, whereas struc-
ture would be the corresponding specializing process of going from e.g. the 
properties or sets or categories, actually serving here as predicates (e.g. of 
modern and urban), back to a single particular house in question.
Of eggs and hatchlings
Here, though, we come across a crucial elementary discussion of tanta-
mount importance in the relationship and tradeoffs between some hard-
core workings of logic in organized rational formal methodical thinking. 
These observations come with full ramifications and repercussions on the 
ground issues pervading theory and empiricism, mathematics and the 
(“exact”) sciences, cause and effect, necessity and sufficiency, causality and 
potentiality as in (required / necessary? ample / sufficient? possible / po-
tential?) cause and effect, discussion and data and conclusions, fact and 
information and fantasy, directionality of the arrows of inference, evidence 
and proof, all subjects slippery and sticky.
Let us start from a very old very familiar example about the hatchling 
baby bird in general, or, say, of “the chicken” in particular. As we all know, 
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by natural law pervading all our experience with living things, no chicken 
comes to this life unless it has grown as a fetus in an egg. Therefore, the 
hatched egg is a necessary condition for the chicken to be born and it is 
safe to conclude, once we see a chicken, that there was an egg in which the 
chicken once was and that, without that egg, our baby could not have ex-
isted. It is understood, of course, that the condition is not sufficient; there 
are eggs that do not lead to chickens because they are not fertilized, or they 
have not been hatched, or they have been cracked, or the hatching has not 
been successful for whatever reason. Therefore, the egg is a potentiality for 
the chicken.
So, this is the biological aspect of things: egg is a necessary but not suffi-
cient cause for a hatchling chicken, a sine qua non as a depot of mechanism, 
but only potential as termination or purpose of the said mechanism, and 
the chicken is a potential effect. However, once one sees the chicken, one 
has ample information to make a secure prediction for an egg of prove-
nance. What are we saying? That, on the level of information as regards 
source, seeing the chicken (the effect of biological birth) is a secure cause 
for information. And that is a prima facie reversal of apparent causality 
pervading the empiricism of observational sciences. How do I know? Sim-
ple: I see the effect of the mechanism which is the cause of my information. 
Bingo! All is ready now for me to get theoretical and empirical causality 
reversed.
Triggering logical inversions
First of all, it should be pointed out that abstract logic, with its con-
cluding and proving (and disproving) methods, is a test in tautology, or 
expressive identity of something stated, regardless of “meaning”: in deep-
er essence, a proof is a check of logical and/or factual equivalence, namely 
of essentially saying the same thing in two alternative sets of propositions, 
regardless of the semantics –or “meaning” of the statement–. In an axiom-
atic theory, all the theorems are tautologous to the full set of the axioms 
and their combinations and the associated definitions. Also, let us bear in 
mind that, following singular statements, an infinity of levels of generaliza-
tion and specialization follow in a series starting with Predicate Logic (of 
“level 1”), setting forth a model of single-stage generalization –via catego-
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ry-marker universal quantifier ∀, for all x– and its inverse one-stage spe-
cialization –via object- or process-focusing marker existential quantifier ∃, 
there exists (at least) one x such that–.
Logical inversion by a simple wide-spread scheme known in ancient 
Latin “philosophical logic” as modus tollens is a good valid way for check-
ing up on the generalizing / specializing process; following upon a tautol-
ogous expressive application of the axioms and definitions as it should, it 
lays out mentally stimulating checks regarding the tautology of converting 
all affirmations to negations and vice versa while, simultaneously, turning 
the syntactic order of the sentence around. In fact, logical inversions by 
modus tollens are but an exemplary application field of simple predicate –
first order– logic. They are as good as predicate logic is; they are bound to 
predicate logic and possible weaknesses in predicate logic reflect fully on 
the possibility to apply such inversions in the first place.
Logically inverted sentences are tautologies and, oftentimes, the prob-
lem of the initial sentence is better demonstrated in its logical inversion. 
For example:
•	 “Everyone that is not with us is against us” is tautologous to
•	 “Everyone that is not against us is with us”
Here, the nonsense of the statement is established by making us real-
ize that its combination with a conjugate statement meaning precisely the 
same thing leads to logical indeterminacy due to inconsistent semantic 
overlap. Simple as it may be, the process of modus tollens logical inversions 
is not only used to couple the universal and the existential quantifiers, but 
also has far-reaching implications when used as a (hard) test for categorical 
inclusion, as was already implied. The relation between the two quantifiers 
is expressed by the following logical inversion, incumbent in the fact that 
the former is established by inclusion of the universal quantifier ∀ in the 
axioms, whereas the latter is a statement of the very definition of the exis-
tential quantifier ∃ by means of a consistent combination of two axiomatic 
entities: the said universal quantifier and the negation operator ¬:
i. by definition:  
ii. by a theorem, validated by an elementary proof: 
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And why is it that validity of inference, used in such predicate-bound 
cases of generalization and specialization and category, can be utilized in 
any inference, which may be applicable to one single example or case? The 
answer to this one is simple. Given that an inference within a proof is a 
check and establishment of a tautology, it regards ALL individual state-
ments compliant to this formulation; our case at hand, then, is an ideal 
indistinct choice representative of anything compliant to the particular 
schematic typology, and that does already presuppose and incorporate an 
accomplished degree of generalization / specialization, which is the nit-
ty-gritty of abstraction, which is what mathematics does and is in the first 
place. In simpler language, an implied generalization says that if A implies 
B, or, in symbols, if A  B, it is understood that “every time A then B”; and 
if the implication (or inference or whatever name we choose for it) is nec-
essary then there is a necessity implied in the generalization of predicate – let 
alone the fact that the Latin word prædicatum is but an acknowledged es-
tablished Latin rendition of Greek syntactical term κατηγόρημα (catēgorē-
ma); and, to whoever understands, that is that.
In what follows we shall examine some implications of employing logi-
cal inversions in the sciences. Some results, far-reaching and tremendously 
groundbreaking as they may be, only result from simple logical steps and 
they do so in an almost automatic fashion. Our examples mean only to 
stimulate and unboggle the mind, in an intent which is most suggestive, 
typical and representative, by no means methodical or exhaustive; we try 
to alert, not to sum up.
CASE STUDY: the maggot-infested meat
Every so often an old woman may notice that, as meat grows stale, it rots 
and/or mildew and maggots develop automatically. Who put them there? 
“They come out of nothing and nowhere, the meat itself creates them”; that 
is what some old people used to think in a magical way of looking at things. 
This may sound odd to us now, but only because we have been accustomed 
to the idea of micro-organisms and to the basic biological assumptions 
about reproduction –one being that spontaneous generation is impossible, 
especially a generation of evolved organisms of creatures singularly iden-
tifiable in the biological classification of the animal kingdom. Of course, 
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Francisco Redi, back in the 17th century, did demonstrate that maggots did 
not appear in meat kept in tightly closed containers.
Anyway, we positively know now that rotting and mildew are due to fungi 
and seeds are needed for them to grow and that eggs are a sine qua non pre-
requisite for a subsequent hatching of maggots. If they do appear (in nature), 
then, no doubt, some mother insect managed to visit the meat and lay min-
iature fertilized eggs perhaps not readily visible to the naked or untrained 
eye. It is time now to explore and develop the logic of the proposition: 
“If there are maggots, there (certainly) have been eggs”.
First observation possible here, but one that people do not always make, 
regards the temporal succession of events / observation implicit in the state-
ment; it is notable that this succession is formally underrated and typically 
lost, if the symbolic formal representation of our observation is simply not-
ed on paper or on the screen as a non-temporal explicit expression “”. We 
claim this is a treacherous simplicity that becomes a misleading, outright 
unscientific and unepistemonic obscurantism, and points in a direction of 
instant loss of focus, despite professing to be stating a simple self-evident 
intuitive and scientific fact. In this paper, we shall see more aspects of the 
relevance of the before – after temporal succession and its relevance in a 
systemic mechanism-bound attestation of the cause-and-effect succession. 
Let us mark this last word in particular; the sciences cannot be warned 
enough of the trap of back-staging or ignoring this principle.
Thus, before we go and unshroud the directionality of this series of 
remarks, let us lay out the unspecified formal development of this state-
ment of ours and of its inversion which, only too often, can be caught just 
blabbering nonsense; and this is nonsense of which no one makes note, to 
which no one pays attention, which possibly no one realizes even:
Indeed, which side is cause and which side is effect here? What is hap-
pening, what do we understand, why are we stating what we are stating and 
how do we know, and says who? Is it a lucid fact that there have been fertil-
ized eggs and that that is the only way for maggots to be here now? Could 
I have had eggs without maggots, and then how would I have found out? 
How could I possibly have known? Did I find eggs? Or am I securely estab-
lishing upon hard evidence, by the (now) common (“scientific”) knowledge 
that an insect has laid eggs and that is why we see maggots now? Let us take 
our pick, by attempting to locate the “plausible” “causal” scheme, on both 
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mutually contradictory sides of respective standard scientific addictions 
(empiricism and proof), which is legitimately inverted by the theorems.
Which is it now? Which is cause and which is effect here? And which 
is plain mechanical scientific fact and which is information theory? And 
which is necessary and which is sufficient? And why? And how can this 
mess be fixed? And why does no one talk about it? Is it because they spon-
taneously “make sense” on face value, despite the difference in context? 
And is context the institutional guarantor of spotting, stating and describ-
ing reality? Is it all of them, despite the fact that they are intuitively in-
congruous and logically mutually inconsistent? At the end of the day, does 
“making sense” make sense even?
In relevance, on another tangent course of thought, if both make sense 
and both hold, I ought to be able to complement the previous arrows with 
their inverses, to turn inferences into logical equivalences and modify the 
preceding scheme by writing:
whence, in some cases that “make sense” (perhaps throughout the sciences):
                                                                      
What difference is there in principle between this and the “whoever is not 
with me” bit? In what sense does this not lead to a generalized institutional 
sensible ambiguity of everything? And why is this new school of thought a 
theory of everything that is relative and uncertain (mark the wording as inten-
tional please)? And does this not lead directly into a dark era of expert opinion 
reintroducing a new-age sorcery or a magical or eschatological or para-theo-
logical verbosity? Could we not do something as simple as demanding:
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•	 separate causalities for necessary and for sufficient?
•	 separate causalities for abstract / concrete and analytic / synthetic with 
STATED boundary each time?
•	 separate causalities for affirmative and negative, with a good law con-
joining, reconciling and connecting the two via a good rigorous su-
pra-structure?
•	 separate (mutually inverse) causalities for (theoretical proof-orientated 
/ institutional conceptual systemic) episteme and/or for (practical verifi-
cation-orientated / informational perceptual observational) science and 
for their validations and rejections?
•	 theoretical anatomy of causality once mutual independence of cause and 
effect has been secured, i.e. for making effectively and absolutely proce-
durally sure that a said “cause” is ruled out from being an (alleged?) effect 
of the effect, even partially, and that a said “effect” is ruled out from being 
an (alleged?) cause of the cause?
Causality and arrows of inference
Indeed, the question spontaneously arises: what is causal and what is 
casual here and in “exact” science and how? After aeons of darkness, both 
episteme and science came to shed light on the relationship between us, our 
organisms and the way we perceive things in our share of the biosphere. By 
definition, as regards all living creatures on this planet, we are all captive to 
our ways and abilities of perception and conception, or else we die; fittest 
means best adjusted. The alleged and attested breach between our senses, 
our sensory information processing, our pattern recognition, our conclu-
sions, our reasoning, our modeling, our testing, our experimentation and 
our logic, our intellect, all this has its roots in intake, internalization and 
internal processing. We are living creatures, aren’t we? Well, then, let’s face 
it, that’s what we are designed to do.
Some epistemological “schools of thought” think they are advanced and 
cool by dismissing the naïveté and backwardness of matching the incoming 
stimuli and information to the intrinsic processing, interpretation, testing 
and learning, through an interface of matching signal received to intuition 
to recognition. If any system of science or logic barges in triumphantly pos-
ing and drawing value and utility out of being “non-intuitive (and thence 
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even counter-intuitive)”, it is probably suspect of darkness. One should 
beware and perhaps fight against epistemonic and/or scientific schools of 
thought spitting out endless and uninhibited volumes of self-referential and 
self-indulgent and effete narratives and circular schemes, often cryptic ones, 
where ultimately A proves B because B proves A and so forth, all smothered 
in a murky sauce of people in closed circles who are experts at themselves 
and at each other. What makes no sense is neither epistemonic nor scientific 
nor true, in some applicable, proper and true sense of “true sense”.
And, if logic gets a free pass at being not necessarily intuitive, that does 
not mean that is should be conceivable as necessarily not intuitive; and if 
something could, as a last resort, be non-intuitive, how can this statement 
be construed as freedom for a proposition to be counterintuitive? Says 
who? Says someone with a bipolar disorder that cannot tell among nec-
essary and sufficient and unnecessary and insufficient and between rights 
and duties? Should such individuals not visit a specialist and solicit help?
In the good old humanistic ways of the world, logic shall be reason and 
reason shall be logic and it must be checked for proper behaviour and, 
wherever it gets caught ill-behaving, it shall be revised and rectified. Has 
it not been sufficiently redone already? Unfortunately, the authors do not 
think so at all and are all too aware of the gravity of this statement that they 
are making.
Multipolar anatomy of logical inversions
In this next technical section of this paper, then, the authors will lay out 
the framework and context and let the recipients of the text to think it out 
by themselves, without forcing any ready-made conclusions, but use this 
tribune as an impulse to think out. The maggot – egg statements and logical 
inversions to be checked, starting upon the occasion of this proposition, 
would form some minimal logical quadripoles to scrutinize, calling for the 
dialectics implicating some of their formal and contextual inversions.
Before checking necessities and inversions and alleged and/or real equiv-
alences and tautologies, regardless of meanings and truths and sense-mak-
ing and time sequences and precedences and causality arrows, we must make 
sure i. that we have two full quadripoles of four (4) statements each, ii. that 
the temporality and “certainty” (in fact conviction) of the statements wishes 
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and tries hard to follow a bona fide route of “pre-established knowledge of 
institutional asymmetries”, in that spotting of maggots leads to the conclu-
sion that there certainly have been eggs in some past time, whereas detection 
of eggs leads to the conclusion that there may come to be maggots in some 
future time (make particular note of that) and, last but not least, the conju-
gate pair that ii.a that the first group A. of four start from observation, i.e. 
they are orientated in the proper old-fashion sense (both directional sense 
and reasonable sense made) of empiricism and of “exact” science (observa-
tion to experimentation to hypothesis to theory to law), whereas ii.b that 
the second group B. of four more start from sensible established legitimate 
scientific knowledge, i.e. they are orientated in the proper old-fashion sense 
(both directional sense and reasonable sense made) of bona fide established 
scientific knowledge of systemic mechanism starting with empiricism and 
application of law. If, now, someone already sees the philosophical and epis-
temological problem here, we sympathize; and if someone thinks it is all 
naïve and resolved, they are welcome to their convictions.
The reader is requested to remark that what is in parentheses regarding 
timing and necessity / sufficiency are not parts of the formal statement, 
nor do they seem to be required except on an interpretation / application / 
meaning level, which changes everything in the scientific declaration and 
appraisal but does not seem to be required in the logical form of the state-
ment. That happens simply because there are no propositional calculus 
modifiers of those sorts used in the “exact” sciences. The scientists practis-
ing them do however believe that they do indeed direct their arguments in 
this “logical” fashion and try to check their assertions by putting them on 
various theoretical “logical contraptions / machines” (cf. the Turing ma-
chine, especially in association to its equivalence to one of Goedel’s historic 
theorems), letting it all boil down to whether the machine will eventually 
stop or be caught in an endless or never-terminating circle. And that is sup-
posed to lead to adequate conclusions regarding truths or realities or some 
haphazard inadequately discriminated concoction of the two.
When does the “machine” establish untruth? Is it if it stops on a nega-
tion or refutation of some statement, or is it if it shall never stop? Meaning 
what? Do they amount to the same or not, and if they differ what is the 
nature of their difference? Does non-stopping establish a cul-de-sac or an 
undecidability? What is the correct establishment of degrees of certainty 
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in the all-purpose, unconditional, time-orientated causal scientific syllo-
gism –which is what scientific syllogisms try to be and are happy if they 
achieve this goal? And what is the current holding flow of time in a uni-
verse that purports itself to be what it is “thermodynamically”? And is that 
inescapable? And what happens if it isn’t? And “where”? And what is the 
theoretical and factual difference between the pair “inputs / considerations 
– outputs / conclusions” and “cause – effect”? And is an untruth the same 
as a falsehood? Why or why not? Says who?
No matter who says, anyone will attest that we are made to recognize that 
a systemic mechanism will produce cause-and-effect in a connected associ-
ated conjugate repetitive before-after scheme, where cause is mobilized be-
fore and effect results after, and if, empirically speaking, I see something and 
identify it as an effect looking for its cause, I see it first and, upon completing 
investigation of my information-receiving source, I conclude thereupon, i.e. 
afterwards, something about what preceded (before), if I make the assess-
ment that my depot and earliest possible source of stimulus is an effect of 
some cause that has preceded in the flow of things. We only react to stimuli 
thus because we are animals and we can’t help it, that’s how neuro-proces-
sors are designed, their speed being only finite and their function producing 
an observable effect;  of what cause? The problem is obvious.
The quadripoles of the maggot
A.
1. If (there are?) maggots, then (there are? / there can be? / there must 
be? / there can have been? there must have been?) eggs.
2. If (there are?) maggots, then (there are? / there can be? / there must 
be? / there can have been? there must have been?) no eggs.
3. If (there are?) no maggots, then (still) (there are? / there can be? / 
there must be? / there can have been? there must have been?) eggs.
4. If (there are?) no maggots, then (there are? / there can be? / there 
must be? / there can have been? there must have been?) no eggs.
Here is the example of a direct application of predicate tautologous in-
version by the axioms, definitions and theorems stated above. In particular, 
what is important is to show that in propositional logic any valid case has a 
valid inversion in the following tautology:
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•	 “Every time there are maggots, there are eggs” is tautologous with its 
logical inversion:
•	 “Every time there are no eggs, there are no maggots”.
Thus, in the four numbered statements above, there is no tautology be-
tween any two by virtue of inversion, because the four statements present 
an independent quadripole of four independent statements. Let us now 
try to check the four systemic scientific and/or logical assertions reflecting 
possible laws by juxtaposing another four (4) independent logical clauses, 
constituting – as it is supposed to turn out– logical inversions of the pre-
ceding quadripole by virtue of modus tollens and therefore tautologous to 
it on a one-to-one basis.
B.
1. If (there are? / there have been?) eggs, then (there are? / there may 
be? / there can be? / there must be? / there can come to be? / there 
must come to be?) maggots.
2. If (there are? / there have been?) eggs, then (there are? / there may 
be? / there can be? / there must be? / there can come to be? / there 
must come to be?) no maggots.
3. If (there are? / there have been?) no eggs, then (still) (there are? / 
there may be? / there can be? / there must be? / there can come to 
be? / there must come to be?) maggots.
4. If (there are? / there have been?) no eggs, then (there are? / there can 
be? / there must be? / there can come to be? / there must come to 
be?) no maggots.
By logical inversions, in this loose sense, the “correct” correspondence 
would be:
A.1. to B.4., A.2. to B.2., A.3. to B.3., A.4. to B.1.
Are these, then, normal contents of the legitimate body of purported 
“logically rigorous” “scientific” “proofs”? And are proofs tautologies as they 
ought to be? Where? We shall let the reader check for themselves when, 
where, under what circumstances, in which formulation these pairs of 
statements say or do not say the same thing, and, if they don’t, what is 
the difference, and why anyone should seriously take such proofs as estab-
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lished, if proofs are supposed to be unconditional – there is no such thing 
as general-acceptance conditional proof, because this is like saying “A is 
identical to B except it isn’t” and “there are thongs identical that are more 
identical than other things identical”. Who thinks that they are kidding 
whom here? Is this the “logic” of the “exact sciences” or of George Orwell’s 
Animal farm? And, finally, should we be grateful to the technique of modus 
tollens logical inversions for uncovering the deadlock? And should we or 
should we not revert to it and use it more often and more conscientiously 
for checking up on our statements?
Anyone can see here that these equivalences are not unconditional, but 
need to be accompanied by a good nice reasonable commentary about the 
implication of fact, perception and temporal sequences, about necessity 
and sufficiency and conditionality, about aspects of theory, of subjectivity 
and objectivity, all about the observer and the observed.
Let us point out once again that logical inversions are supposed to be 
tautologies. The reader may immediately grasp that conjugate supposed 
tautologous pair of numbers, despite urgent need of further specifications 
regarding feature like the ones of which we already persistently made note 
and with all due caution regarding answering the stuff carrying the ques-
tion marks:
•	 A1 and B4 are what instituted human perception and science hold 
as necessary fact;
•	 A2 and B2 are deranged garbage;
•	 A3 and B3 are superstitions, sorcery, and old wives’ tales;
•	 A4 and B1 are just potential possibilities to maybe consider at will.
However, at no point should we lose view of the perspective that logical 
inversion, especially one carried out in modus tollens has strict mutatis mu-
tandis rules. Combinations are not spontaneously unconditionally tautol-
ogous, in the sense that in one of the attempted pairing a slice of semantic 
charge has been put in or taken out or changed. But that is not all; people 
only too often make a capital error when they negligently just reverse the 
order, unduly turning necessities into potentialities and cases into general-
ities and all kinds of such confusions, thinking that they are making sense. 
This is where one must be very adamant in pointing out the impropriety 
of the conclusion. Contrary to some simple-folk-talk we all hear only too 
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often, checking across the rest of the statements, the following “simplified” 
pseudo-inversion may NOT be considered as a tautology!
•	 “Every time there are maggots, there are eggs” does not necessarily 
imply that (and is not tautologous to):
•	 “Every time there are eggs, there are maggots”.
As we shall demonstrate in what follows, alas, this is not a unique priv-
ilege of simple folk; major scientific fallacies exist right now exactly be-
cause (illogical) mis-inversions, such as the last one, are implicitly accepted 
as tautologies, whereas they are separate cases not necessarily having or 
sharing the same rules, the same models and the same truth-values as the 
original sentence.
Scientific causalities?
So many additional factors enter here in very treacherous manners re-
garding abstract theory and the scientifically orientated models. Let us 
choose one at random and watch it. What is cause and effect in, say, grav-
ity? Things fall. That is an observable effect and a source of information, 
therefore an empirical cause of expressing a question and of formulating 
a problem. Why? Is there a cause in the spirit of a droit naturel like an 
analogue of the egg here? Alas no. Newtonian mechanics says the cause is 
gravity, and that gravity is a force and causes attraction / mutual acceler-
ation. Is any of this anything like a natural cause like the egg? Absolutely 
not. Did something exist before? So? Should a bona fide epistemologist not 
demand of empiricism to empirically observe and record the natural cause 
like it does an egg? Where is the force? Is it perhaps in a ubiquitous decen-
tralized neutral bearing 3D space of no focus, consisting of 0D points that 
are despite it 1D vectors that form a spatial field of directional points that 
are not directional, in this neutral space that has no focus but does have a 
centre of coordinates which is not a centre and is thus centralized but isn’t?
And what is attraction and what is force? Is it an object? Definitely not! 
Is it a phenomenon? Definitely not! Is it observable? Definitely not! Was 
it before? Was it independent? Well, maybe not… Then how can it be an 
empirical cause like the egg? Is it even a cause? Not really; in a proper frame 
of mind of our being duly cool and distant about stuff, as epistemonic prin-
ciple would wish us to be, what is not observable should not be a source of 
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observation so it cannot even be a cause of information release. If we want 
to be cool, a page of equations and whole sets of tensors recording attrac-
tion and force is a mental model on paper of nothing more than systemic 
recording of an acceleration behaviour, a schematic systemic arrangement 
of mentally prior-posterior manifestations of abstract postulated patterns 
of relationships, totally unreal, nothing like the egg-type cause.
Where are we heading at? Watch! Why do things fall? Because there is 
gravity. Why is there gravity? Because things fall. And what is gravity? It is 
a force. And what is a force? The cause of acceleration. And why is there 
acceleration? Because there is force. And why is there force? Because we 
observe acceleration, don’t you? OK then, what is the cause for the cause? 
It is a field. Why is there a field? Because I conclude there is acceleration. 
Why do I conclude that? Because things fall. OK, but WHY IS THERE 
gravity? Because it is a curvature in space-time. And how do you know? 
Here are the equations. And why are the equations what they are? Because 
space-time curves. And what is space-time? There you go again, I told you, 
here are the equations….
And then, suddenly no; it is space-time curvature, not a force, and that 
has been “proved by Einstein”. If it has been proved, then it should be an 
abstract theorem and its proof must have been a tautology. But suppose the 
language here is loose and by proof we just mean verification. What was 
verified? Was it the cause, that was pre-extant, or was there a congruence 
of an abstract model established and (in a manner of speaking) “verified” 
as consistent to the observed behaviour? Why then isn’t the said behaviour 
both (its own) cause and (its own) effect, or better said an auto-cause / au-
to-effect syndrome, if nothing in it existed before, outside and independent-
ly of what we observed? And if this physics is not Newtonian, and if the 
alleged space-time-curvature is an intrinsic feature of the universe’s hy-
per-geometry, why does it cause acceleration? Or are some accelerations’ 
causes not acceleration’s causes? Or are some forces less forces than others? 
If yes, are we indeed taking walks on the wild side of George Orwell’s An-
imal farm? If not, then what is the definition of force and non-force, since 
the Newtonian one we have been using is sometimes unusable? Where? 
Why? When? Where not? Why not? When not? Says who?
Conclusion: there is no equivalence of the natural empirical causality of 
our biological paradigm of seeds and mildew and eggs and hatchling chick-
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ens and maggots in spoiled meat in physical theory dealing in quasi-ab-
stract or would-be-abstract models, because mathematical abstraction de-
mands lack of semantic significance, whereas these physical formulations 
do mean things.
Are we, then, to conclude that if something is not directly observable –as 
in figures and strains of characters and symbols on “my” sheets of writing 
and “my” computer screens–, it stays hypothetical and cannot be construed 
as systemic cause and source, but only on the fringe, as a ghost hypothesis 
useful for description and systematization and study, but equivalent to the 
effect of some phantom mechanism, itself functional only as a similarly 
phantom cause of information? And what else would that mean about oth-
er “things” and “phenomena” not individually directly observable, such as 
say a single photon, but only “through their cumulative physical effects”? 
Or, worse, like dark matter which is an “unverified” side-effect of our equa-
tions, just to be tossed in to make them work? Would this, then, by this 
analysis, mean that such stuff would be “causes of information” towards 
“effects of description”, totally upsetting the integrated normal image of 
natural cause and effect like egg and maggot? And would that lead to the 
apt conclusion that such things are not acceptable as empiricist science, let 
alone “exact”, and cannot be construed either as necessary nor as sufficient, 
because there is no natural right applicable even on an honest-to-goodness 
mutatis mutandis basis? Are we saying this? Are we?
So, then, what is the cause? Is it the syndrome or is it the symptoms? 
And how much of the syndrome is aspects of the symptoms and vice versa? 
How much of it is in the before and how much is in the after? Is this total 
jumble, this loss of directionality of cause vs. effect, an inseparable mish-
mash of rationalist and magic thinking? Is it? And is an epistemologist en-
titled to dig up his/her stuff in this manner? Is he/she expected or required 
to do so? We are afraid that we shall have to leave these questions hanging 
at this point and proceed further, in the hope that some light will shine 
showing the way to a meaningful exit.
Post Scriptum
Have we managed to boggle the minds of the reader? If we have, it was 
neither intentional nor desired; our own minds have been boggled for the 
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longest time as well. However, this tedious agonizing quasi-nihilistic trip 
has been delightful in a wildly perverse sort of way. How about expecting 
a sequel for it in the next issue, say… about… opening a new gate to… di-
mensions and geometry and whatever else that may bring?
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